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William Bradford
Introduction

Does international law matter, or is it but a “fairy ship upon a fairy sea: a beautiful
construct of the legal imagination floating upon a sea of false assumptions[?]”2 International
legal compliance [“ILC”],3 the newest and most rapidly developing subfield in international law,
was born in the early 1990s from the revived debate between legalization theorists, a group
committed to the belief that the transformations wrought by the end of the Cold War have
rendered international law independently capable of constraining and shaping the behavior of
states, and their critics, a camp committed to the contrary notion that international law remains
primarily an aspirational enterprise subordinate to politics and epiphenomenal to state practice.
In attempting to prevail on the question of the efficacy of international law, legalists and skeptics
alike have set about propounding and testing an array of interrelated theories, and in the process
the questions of whether, and if so, why and under what circumstances states elect to comply
with international law have emerged as the most central and pressing issues within the
international legal academy. Building upon the insights of international relations theory and the
methodologies of the social sciences, the field of ILC has organized around competing answers
to these meta-questions, and the body of ILC scholarship now consists of eight books and nearly
one hundred articles.
This Bibliography lists and annotates the major entries within the ILC corpus. For each
entry a brief summary, together with one or more numbers corresponding to a list of major ILC
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themes, is provided. Although it is intended to be complete and comprehensive, the
Bibliography does not list every article that could arguably be included within the ILC corpus.
Short articles duplicative of the previous work of scholars have been omitted, as have articles
that are tangentially connected to ILC or are largely descriptive, rather than analytical. Although
the majority of ILC scholars are legal academics, an effort has been made to include the works of
authors in related fields such as international relations and economics.
The methodology is as follows. A search of Westlaw, Lexis, and Worldcat was
conducted to identify every potential book and article in the field of ILC. Each source was then
read to ensure that it fit within the field. Additional articles cited or discussed by the authors of
each source were noted for possible inclusion. A preliminary draft of the Bibliography was sent
to each author for comments, corrections, and suggestions for additional authors and sources.
To be included in the Bibliography, each source was required to address one or more
themes that constitute the field of ILC. These themes, along with the number and letter scheme
employed to denote them, are as follows:
1. General theory. Many ILC scholars have advanced competing theories to explain and
predict patterns of compliance and noncompliance in international relations. These various
theories, described in the annotations accompanying relevant bibliographic entries, can be
organized into the following series of theoretical clusters: (a) realism, (b) enforcement theory, (c)
rational choice theory, (d) liberal theory, (e) managerial theory, (f) reputational theory, (g)
transnational legal process, (h) legitimacy theory, (i) constructivism, (j) organizational-cultural
theory, and (k) personality theory.
2. Empirical analysis. ILC scholars are increasingly moving beyond mere descriptive
work or thought experimentation and are subjecting ILC theories to empirical analysis. Several
have applied the methodological tools of the social and natural sciences, including multivariate
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statistics, rigorous comparative analysis, and detailed case studies, to develop testable and
falsifiable general propositions regarding relationships between rules and behaviors and to
inform proposals for regime modification.
3. Skeptics. A minority of ILC scholars insist that compliance is the exception rather
than the rule and that international law is little more than an aspirational venture. Some, without
rejecting outright the causal significance of law in regard to state behaviors, contend that
legalization inversely correlates with compliance with the normative principles underlying
regimes.
4. Critical perspectives. Several scholars treat the question of compliance as the point of
entry to challenge international law more generally as illegitimate for failing to include or for
subordinating a plethora of subnational organizations, groups, and peoples.
5. Relationship to domestic law and institutions. A number of scholars link compliance
with international law to the structure or function of domestic law or institutions, typically by
treating incorporation of international law within the domestic legal system as a necessary
condition precedent to compliance or by describing domestic courts as the only effective sites for
enforcement.
6. High/Low Politics. The assumption central to the discipline of international law that
regards international relations as uniformly susceptible to legal regulation may well be false.
Some ILC scholars contend very directly that a hierarchy of issue-areas orders the international
legal system and that patterns of cooperation have been far easier to generate and sustain in
respect to “low politics,” generally understood as economic, cultural, and social issues, than in
questions of “high politics,” defined narrowly as matters of war and peace. Other scholars,
without directly asserting a high/low politics distinction, simply confine their analyses of
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findings to the particular low politics issue-areas under investigation and refrain from
generalizing to other issue-areas.
7. Survey. Many of the authors provide an overview, description, and a critique of some
or all of the various ILC theories.
8. Human Agency. A small group of scholars with interdisciplinary backgrounds regards
the state as an abstraction without the capacity to exercise a choice between alternatives and thus
treats the question of compliance as one of human agency. For human agency theorists within
the ILC field, people, rather than states, make compliance decisions, and the objective of their
scholarship is producing an account for the microfoundations of personality that are causally
linked to compliance.
9. Methodological and Epistemological Issues. Part of the literature within the ILC field
is dedicated to the operationalization of the concept of compliance as a testable phenomenon, the
design of experiments to test causal relationships between legal regimes and state behaviors, the
selection and application of analytical methods to assess compliance data, the systematic and
rigorous interpretation of research findings, the validation of data, methods, and conclusions, and
the articulation and evaluation of knowledge claims.
10. Effectiveness. A group of empirically-minded scholars have called into question
whether “compliance” is an adequate conceptual framework within which to evaluate whether
international legal regimes further their normative policy objectives. Because a high level of
compliance with a given regime may simply reflect the failure to require states to undertake
anything more than modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an
agreement, and because certain agreements that impose significant constraints may meet with
relatively low levels of compliance without sabotaging the norms states-parties seek to advance,
the concept of “effectiveness”, defined as the degree to which a regime is successful in
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transforming state behaviors consistent with the norms that underlie the regime, has been
introduced as a substitute for compliance.
The following annotations, of course, cannot begin to do justice to the rich body of
thought they summarize; at most, they identify several major themes in each source. Readers are
encouraged to engage with the complete works themselves.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbott, Kenneth W., “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1 (1993). (1e, 2).
Develops a modified rational choice theory of compliance that assumes that selfinterested states can be motivated to cooperate provided uncertainties as to other states’
intentions and actions that impede cooperation can be reduced through a combination of
verification and assurance procedures. Employs iterated prisoners’ dilemma to the study of
several arms control regimes to support the hypothesis that enhanced monitoring and verification
are complementary strategies that promote compliance by increasing transparency, equalizing
information, and enhancing payoffs for cooperation. Suggests that the appropriate package of
measures is specific to each treaty member and that general theories of compliance are perhaps
beyond the state of the discipline, at least in the issue-area of arms control.
Aceves, William J., Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of
Equitable Distribution, 39 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 299 (2001). (3,4,5).
Imports insights from Critical Legal Studies metatheory to reinforce the central premise
of legitimacy theory and transnational legal process theory: that compliance is a function of the
degree to which substance and process of a legal regime is generally perceived as fair and
inclusive of all stakeholders. Suggests that existing international institutional designs are
insufficiently legitimate because they fail to incorporate a great many subnational groups.
Faults the principle of equitable distribution for broadening the inclusiveness of institutions with
regard to states but perpetuating the exclusion of subnational organizations, groups, peoples, and
people. Suggests, but does not specify, a deconstructivist program for enhancing the fairness of
international law is the proper direction for the marriage of CLS and ILC theories.
Alder, Jacqueline, & Lugten, Gaul, Frozen Fish Block: How Committed are North Atlantic States
to Accountability, Conservation and Management of Fisheries?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 345
(2002). (2,10).
Surmises that compliance rates are positively correlated with per capita gross national
product. Cautions, however, that many states, without regard to wealth, often substitute
instrument compliance, defined as the ratification of an international agreement to “satisfy the
public face of international law” and appease domestic constituencies without the intent to
actually alter national behaviors, for genuine compliance.
Aldrich, George H., Compliance with the Law: Problems and Prospects, in Effecting Compliance
(Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer, eds., 2000). (5,6).
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Lists major causal factors of noncompliance as ignorance of legal obligations, skepticism
as to the efficacy of enforcement measures, and absence of effective monitoring and disputeresolution mechanisms. Suggests that domestic incorporation of international law is a necessary
condition precedent to compliance. Regards the project of effecting compliance with the laws of
war as the major challenge of the contemporary international legal order.
Alvarez, Jose E., Why Nations Behave, 19 Mich. J. Int’l. L. 303 (1998). (7)
Maps out the immediate post-Cold War origins of ILC and surveys convergence of
international law and international relations scholarship in the form of several emerging theories,
including managerialism, liberalism, enforcement theory, and constructivism. Suggests that the
various divergent ILC theories may ultimately converge around transnational legal process
theory, which posits that internalization of cooperative norms in domestic law and legal
institutions fosters the progressive evolution of rule-governed cooperation.
American Society of International Law, How are Nations Behaving?, 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.
205 (2002). (7,9).
Hypothesizes that failure to accede to international legal regimes may be the functional
equivalent of noncompliance, particularly for hegemonic states. Notes that recent empirical
scholarship has called into question the presumption that compliance is the rule rather than the
exception, yet notes further that empiricism in the ILC field is impeded by limitations on data,
selection biases, difficulties in generalizing from limited data sets and from one issue-area to
another, and methodological obstacles to conceptualizing compliance. Describes the state of the
discipline as rife with theoretical divergence yet ripe for future discoveries on the basis of a
dynamic interdisciplinary research agenda.
Ardia, David S., Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws
Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 497 (1998). (1e, 2).
Sketches the limitations of the enforcement model of ILC in regard to international
marine environmental protection, including a lack of clarity as to jurisdiction, the costliness of
sanctions, and the abundance of violations by non-state actors. Proposes that successful
enforcement requires more effective detection of noncompliance which in turn requires enhanced
monitoring. Posits that NGOs have a role to play as compliance monitors.
Arend, Anthony Clark, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38
Va. J. Int’l L. 107 (1998). (1i, 7).
Surveys and critiques theories of ILC. Argues that constructivism, which regards
compliance as a function of the congruence between the socially-constructed normative
preferences of key states and individuals on the one hand and formal legal rules on the other,
provides the greatest insight into explanation and prediction of patterns of state compliance.
Bailey, Robert A., Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in
Two Gulf Wars, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 103 (2000). (2,8).
Examines the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War and rejects the
central premise of enforcement theory—that sanctions, or the threat of reprisal, are sufficient to
enforce compliance with legal obligations. Suggests that variance in compliance with the laws of
war as between states is attributable primarily to individual-level psychological attributes of
decisionmakers responsible for compliance decisions. Concludes that failures to comply with
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legal regimes that codify norms of jus cogens may be inexplicable through rational choice
theory.
Baxter, Richard, Forces for Compliance with the Law of War, Am. Soc. Int’l L. 82 (1964). (1b,
3, 5, 8).
Treats individuals as the primary subjects of the laws of war. Develops one of the earliest
articulations of enforcement theory within the ILC canon. Regards compliance with the
international laws of war as a function of whether the domestic laws of the states of nationality
create adequate punitive sanctions and whether domestic military institutions effectively
investigate and prosecute offenses.
BEYERLIN, ULRICH, & MARAUHN, THILO, LAW-MAKING AND LAWENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE 1992 RIO
CONFERENCE (1997). (1e, 2, 5)
Argues that the most effective means of achieving compliance with international
environmental law is a flexible and ad hoc strategy of law-enforcement based on partnership
rather than traditional, repressive means of law-enforcement, such as unilateral sanctions or
reprisals. Describes as “compliance control” procedures of reporting, monitoring, fact-finding,
and consultation designed to reduce conflict and tension between states and as “compliance
assistance” the provision of environmental education and training, personnel, administrative and
legislative support, and technology transfers to less-developed states.
Bhattacharyya, Rupa, Establishing a Rule-of-Law International Criminal Justice System, 31 Tex.
Int’l L.J. 57 (1996). (3,5).
Argues that compliance with international criminal law is a function of the degree to
which the substantive rules are widely perceived as legitimate. Predicts that formalization of
international criminal law will correlate with increased compliance. Concludes that the success
of international criminal legal institutions such as the ICC will hinge upon voluntary compliance,
which in turn will require its rules of substantive law, as well as its procedures, to be widely
perceived as legitimate.
Bird, Robert C., Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of Space Debris, 40 Am.
Bus. L.J. 635 (2003). (1i, 8).
Dismisses sanctions or other mechanisms recommended by enforcement theory as useful
to the promotion of cooperation regarding the control of space debris. Counters with a
constructivist account that credits epistemic communities of scientists with responsibility for
generating norms and securing compliance with legal rules incorporating these norms through
the mobilization of shame, or the use of peer pressure. Argues that government officials who
must ultimately determine whether to comply with resulting regimes are sensitive to and
dependent upon the scientific community and will be discouraged from noncompliance by their
scientific advisors, who would suffer shame if they did not dissuade officials from
noncompliance.
Bradford, William C., In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, 37
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2005). (1k, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9).
Surveys and critiques existing ILC theories. Develops a personality-based theory to
explain and predict compliance with the law of war regime governing anticipatory self-defense.
Describes the use of simulation research to test and refine personality theories of ILC.

7

Bradley, Curtis A., Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
Stan. L. Rev. 529 (1999). (1a, 3, 5).
Suggests that the U.S. interest in international legal compliance is structurally
subordinated to its commitment to federalism and its dualist legal system. Implies that monist
legal systems are, ceterus paribus, more likely to comply with international law than dualist
systems, which regard domestic law as occupying the apex in the hierarchy of legal sources.
Brimeyer, Benjamin L., Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade Organization: The
Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance from Superpower
Nations, 10 Minn. J. Glob. Trade 133 (2001). (2,3,6).
Contends that the WTO Dispute Settlement Process has failed to achieve compliance
because it has yet to earn the general perception of legitimacy, both substantive and procedural.
Queries whether available sanctions may be less onerous than reputational penalties for
noncompliance. Implies that international economic law may trigger sovereignty concerns that
predispose self-interested states toward noncompliance.
Brunnée, Jutta, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and Enforcement in the Design of a Compliance
Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 223 (2000). (1b/e, 2, 6).
Examines the negotiations toward the Kyoto Protocol compliance regime. Queries, as a
result of the empirical evidence, whether high rates of compliance with legal regimes may be a
function of the limited degree of behavioral modification demanded thereby and whether
compliance with legal regimes is inversely related to the extent to which substantive
commitments require states to depart from the conduct in which they would have engaged absent
the regime. Theorizes that the proper compliance strategy for any given regime is situated along
a “persuasive continuum” stretching from purely facilitative measures at one extreme to purely
punitive measures at the other.
Cassel, Douglass, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L.
121 (2001). (1e/g/i, 2, 5).
Attributes compliance with international human rights law to multiple sources of
causation, including the diffusion of behavioral norms and the reconstruction of individual and
group identities around its protective principles, the incorporation of international treaties in
domestic legal systems, and the increased availability of international and regional judicial fora
with jurisdiction over claims of violations by states. Suggests that the effectiveness of
international human rights law is further affected by intervening contextual variables, such as the
political and cultural nature of domestic governments and the relative threat to the survival of
states at a given moment. Concedes that it is difficult to submit this hypothesis to empirical
testing.
Charlesworth, Hilary, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92 Am. Soc’y
Int’l L. Proc. 44 (1998). (3,5,10).
Examines the consequences of the participation of non-state actors upon the formation of
customary international law. Predicts a “compliance paradox” wherein the engagement of nonstate actors increases the perception of fairness in the development of custom but erodes
consensus, weakens the normative strength of resulting legal rules, and allows state governments
greater freedom to be selective in accepting only those legal obligations that correspond with
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their interests. Queries whether the participation of non-state actors in the formation of
customary international law may ultimately erode the pursuit of justice through law.
Charney, Jonathan L., Compliance with International Soft Law, in Commitment and
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International System (Dinah Shelton, ed.
2000). (7,9).
Surveys ILC theories. Identifies a series of variables relevant to the phenomenon of
compliance. Treats linkages between the norms that underlie legal regimes and a host of
procedural, moral, and material considerations as the most relevant to explanations and
predictions of compliance.
CHAYES, ABRAM, & CHAYES, ANTONIA, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995). (1e, 7).
Posits that states are naturally imbued with a propensity to compliance with international
law. Regards instances of noncompliance as exceptional and attributable not primarily to
deliberate violation but rather to either a lack of precision in ambiguous or indeterminate treaties
or a lack of technical capacity that prevents states willing to comply from physically doing so.
Considers enforcement measures or sanctions an expensive “waste of time” and maintains that
consultation, negotiation, and persuasion are sufficient to adjust preferences and steer states back
into conformity. Concludes that, because compliance problems are largely managerial,
enhancement of the capacities of weaker and poorer states and organization of compliance efforts
by powerful states willing to bear management costs are the key to enhancing the effectiveness of
international law.
Cuellar, Mariano-Florentino, Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 Stan. J. Int’l
L. 211 (2004). (1e/h, 2, 9).
Evaluates the success of the UN system in providing for collective security. Suggests
that compliance failures are often the product of a failure of domestic sovereignty in which the
central government loses the capacity to prevent violations of law by subnational actors. Argues
that while the international legal regime governing collective security is not self-enforcing, state
behaviors can be causally transformed by law to the extent that the regime is (1) perceived as
legitimate and thus the costs associated with behavior consistent with the regime decrease
accordingly, or (2) the regime enhances collective action and thereby decreases the costs of
employing enforcement measures.
D’Amato, Anthony, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
1110 (1982). (1a, 3).
Suggests that the limited reach of universal judicial jurisdiction and the paralysis of the
UN collective security system due to the exercise of veto powers hobble the effectiveness of
sanctions, the primary coercive modality within the enforcement model of compliance. Notes
that the only universally effective mechanism for ensuring compliance with international law
remains the traditional system of retorsion and reprisal. Concludes that the ineffectiveness of
enforcement suggests not that scholars and practitioners should abandon efforts to enhance
compliance, but cautions that compliance with international human rights law is ultimately a
matter not of law but of politics and morality.
Di Mento, Joseph F.C., Process, Norms, Compliance, and International Environmental Law, 18
J. Envt’l L. & Litig. 251 (2003). (1g/i, 5).
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Surveys ILC theories. Describes a theory, labeled the “Transactional Norm Forming
Model,” that amalgamates elements of constructivism and transnational legal process theories
and contends that compliance is a function of the social construction of states and relevant elites
consistent with the normative content of legal regimes as well as the degree to which these
regimes are incorporated in domestic legal systems. Traces the intellectual roots of the proposed
theory.
Downs, George W., Danish, Kyle W., & Barsoom, Peter N., The Transformational Model of
International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 465
(2000). (1e/g/i, 2, 3, 6, 9).
Postulates that the joint transnational legal process/managerialist/constructivist, or
“transformationalist,” premise, that weak or “soft law” regimes in which horizontal negotiation,
cooperation and “carrots” induce states to cooperate are more effective than vertical regimes in
which coercive enforcement measures, or “sticks,” are used to discipline noncompliers is
demonstrably false. Demonstrates systematic empirical support for this critical postulate by
analysis of various environmental and arms control agreements. Concedes the power of
discourse and negotiation to promote interest transformation in individual and small group
settings, but faults transformational theory for failing to develop an account for how convergence
of interests and identities at the individual and group level percolates upward to influence the
preferences of states. Concludes that regimes designed consistent with the transformational
model may actually retard compliance.
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., & Barsoom, Peter N., Is the Good News About
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996). (1b, 3, 6, 10).
Critiques the selection bias in managerial theory that leads to overestimation of the extent
of compliance with international law. Contends that compliance, particularly in issue-areas of
high politics, is highly improbable in the absence of robust enforcement mechanisms that
establish a deterrent regime. Employs the concept “depth of cooperation” to examine several
legal regimes and concludes that states may, in order to preserve the perception of compliance,
be avoiding substantive commitments that would obligate significant behavioral transformations.
Duruigbo, Emeka, International Relations, Economics and Compliance with International Law:
Harnessing Common Resources to Protect the Environment and Solve Global Problems, 31 Cal.
W. Int’l L.J. 177 (2001). (6,7,10).
Calls for shift from the concept of compliance to “effectiveness,” defined as the degree to
which legal regimes effect behavioral transformations consistent with the norms underlying those
regimes. Suggests that the effectiveness of legal regimes is not as great as legalization theorists
maintain. Adopts the managerialist position that enhancement of state capacities should be a
primary method of enhancing the effectiveness of environmental pollution prevention regimes,
and proposes means whereby to achieve greater effectiveness of international environmental law.
Ehrmann, Markus, Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties,
13 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 377 (2002). (1e, 2, 9).
Examines the function of non-compliance procedures in several international
environmental treaties. Concludes that the majority of noncompliance is non-intentional and the
consequence of technical and resource incapacities. Eschews enforcement as costly and
counterproductive. Advocates a “partnership method” for managing compliance whereby
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enhancing the capacity of noncompliers take precedence over enforcement and consultation and
negotiation, rather than sanctions, are employed to resolve compliance disputes.
Falk, Richard A., On Identifying and Solving the Problem of Compliance with International
Law, 58 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 1 (1964). (5, 9).
Describes the primary epistemological problem in measuring compliance as uncertainty
as to the specific behavioral obligation required by the legal rule in question. Contends that
resolution of uncertainty requires the intervention of a neutral and objective third party that can
render an authoritative interpretation of the substantive meaning of the obligation at issue
between parties. Suggests that independent international law experts, provided they are not in
service to their states of nationality, or, in the alternative, supranational institutions, negotiations,
or the quasilegislative process of customary international legal formation can compensate for the
deficiencies of international adjudication of compliance disputes.
Florini, Ann, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 Int’l Stud. Q. 363 (1996). (1i, 5, 7).
Defends the causal significance of norms in prompting compliance with international law.
Surveys and critiques existing theories of ILC. Adopts the insights of neo-Darwinism to advance
the hypothesis that cooperative norms evolve in the manner of natural species and constitute a
form of cultural inheritance upon which compliance can be grounded and extended.
FISHER, ROGER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
(1g/k, 3, 5, 8).
Attributes responsibility for compliance with international law to the individuals at the
apex of the state hierarchy, to whom international legal regimes are ultimately directed and upon
whom decisions with regard to compliance ultimately rest. Highlights the causal significance of
religious, moral, cultural, and psychological sources of normative prescription and proscription
to individual compliance decisions. Regards reputational concerns, threat of enforcement, and
reciprocal effects of compliance as theoretically significant, but considers the degree to which
normative content reflected in international legal regimes is incorporated in domestic legislation
and given effect in domestic courts and institutions as the most important determinants of state
compliance.
FRANCK, THOMAS M., FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995). (1h).
Posits a direct correlation between a regime’s legitimacy—defined as the widespread
perception that its institutions arose and operate in accordance with just procedures and that its
rules are clear and connected to principles of reason, justice, morality, or other first principles—
and compliance. Predicts that as between two legal regimes that are equally legitimate, that
regime with that expresses the most moral content will reap the greatest compliance. Explains
the evolution of legitimacy as a discursive process in which a variety of actors, including
individuals and groups, conceive of and propound norms and exhort others to adhere to them on
the ground that they are procedurally and substantively fair and in so doing create a transnational
perception that legal regimes incorporating such norms are or would be legitimate.
Frischmann, Brett, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 679
(2003). (1c/e, 2, 6).
Draws from and integrates managerial theory, enforcement theory, and more kinetic
rational choice theories to offer a dynamic game-theoretic model hypothesizing that self-
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interested and rational states anticipate that incentives to defect from international agreements
evolve over time and that as a consequence states plan for legal commitments to evolve in order
to preserve positive incentives to comply while limiting the costs of enforcement. Applies gametheoretic models to explain empirical data concerning compliance with international
environmental law and trade law and contends that states pursue three types of compliance
strategies: type I (focused on adjusting states’ incentives to comply by altering payoff structures
(the expected costs and benefits of (non)compliance), type II (focused on facilitating cooperation
by reducing transaction costs and uncertainty as the legal regime evolves), and type III (focused
on maintaining cooperation and improving regime effectiveness by dynamically adjusting
commitments over time). Queries, albeit tacitly, whether scholars should abandon the
development of a unified theory of ILC in favor of issue-area-specific theories.
Gerhart, Peter M., Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory—TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 357 (2000). (4,7,10).
Previews a series of symposium articles that address compliance with the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Postulates a linkage between compliance the
substantive legitimacy of the legal rules in question. Posits that enforcement of international
intellectual property law is ultimately too costly standing alone and that a combination of
modalities, including public enforcement, private enforcement, and voluntary compliance is the
optimal strategy for enhancing effectiveness. Suggests that the conception of international
intellectual property law as fundamentally “Western” or capitalist stands as a barrier to the
internalization of norms favoring voluntary compliance in underdeveloped states.
Ginsburg, Tom, & Adams, Richard H., Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
International Dispute Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229 (2004). (1e, 2, 5, 6).
Rejects the realist presumption that the international system is anarchic and presumes
instead that states are inherently prone to coordinate, if not necessarily always to cooperate.
Offers a game-theoretic explanation for the phenomenon of compliance with adjudicative
decisions of international judicial fora, which lack enforcement power. Contends that states seek
the independent, unbiased expertise of international judicial fora in order to resolve factual
ambiguities and preserve the prospects for future coordination. Concludes that a general theory
of compliance may potentially be constructed that will offer explanations and predictions across
a broad range of issue-areas of international relations.
Goldsmith, Jack, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 959 (2000). (2, 3, 8, 9).
Reviews Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999). Surveys theories
of ILC. Expresses realist skepticism about the independent efficacy of international law,
particularly in relation to the use of force. Criticizes international legal academics for
deliberately failing to employ methodological techniques necessary to develop falsifiable
theories. Elaborates a series of methodological obstacles to developing and testing ILC theories
in the path of international legal academics.
Goldsmith, Jack L., & Posner, Eric A. A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1113 (1999). (1c, 2, 3, 5).
Addresses compliance with customary international law from a rational choice
perspective and with empirical methods. Rejects the notion that states feel any compliance pull
and rejects the notion that norms are significant sources of behavioral constraint. Posits that
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domestic courts are in effect agents whose purpose it is to implement national interests through
their interpretation and application of customary international law. Adopts the realist conclusion
that law is epiphenomenal and treats compliance as the result of the convergence of state interests
with rules.
Goldsmith, Jack L., & Posner, Eric A., International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach,
44 Va. J. Int'l L. 113 (2003). (1c, 9).
Dismisses the causal significance of norms in explanations of state compliance with
international agreements. Regards treaties and other positive or formal sources of law as no
more binding than, and consequently no more likely to secure compliance than, informal
agreements. Explains formal legalization as a means of signaling seriousness about the
commitment to be bound by international agreements but discounts reputational considerations
where a reputation for compliance is not inherently valuable in the given issue-are. Argues that
the coincidence of the self-interests of rational states is the root cause of cooperative behavior
and identifies the convergence of interests as the key to enhancing compliance.
GOLDSMITH, JACK L., & POSNER, ERIC. A, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005). (1c, 2, 7, 9)
Surveys and critiques ILC theories. Explains compliance with international law as the
choice of rational states that maximizes their interests in the accumulation of power or other
goods. Tests a comprehensive theory of international law with empirical evidence across a range
of issue-areas, including human rights and trade, and offers normative prescriptions on the basis
of findings.
Goodman, Ryan, & Jinks, Derek, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 1 (2004). (1f/i/k, 2, 7, 8, 9).
Argues that states are susceptible to socialization designed to encourage them to embrace
and comply with normative requirements in the issue-area of human rights. Differentiates a
program of normative “acculturation” from earlier constructivist theories. Distinguishes
coercion and persuasion, the two most common implementation mechanisms, from acculturation
and describes how a program that mobilizes social and cultural pressures can lead states to
conform their conduct. Specifies some of the psychological microprocesses through which
acculturation reconstructs individual and ultimately state identities and preferences.
Goodman, Ryan, & Jinks, Derek, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 13 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 171 (2002). (2, 7, 9).
Critiques the hypothesis that increased legalization may correlate with decreased
compliance. Surveys existing ILC theories. Defines the central empirical project within ILC as
the identification of the necessary conditions for the domestic incorporation of international
norms into state practice. Cautions against the use of traditional quantitative methods of theory
generation and testing, such as multivariate statistics, given the state of the discipline and the
paucity of data.
Goodman, Ryan, & Jinks, Derek, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 1749 (2003). (1i/j, 2, 6)
Interrogates the hypothesis that a distinction must be drawn between high politics and
low politics in respect to state propensities to comply with international legal regulation, with
effects most pronounced in the issue-area of national security. Examines the organizational-
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cultural approach to explaining the transnational tendencies of national military bureaucracies to
eschew particular methods and means of warfare even where such methods and means are not
unlawful. Concludes that states are socially constructed by the preferences of national military
bureaucracies, that these preferences are organized at the international level, and that even in the
issue-area of national security states can be socialized to comply with legal rules that tap these
common normative preferences.
Greenwood, Christopher, Ensuring Compliance with International Law, in Control Over
Compliance with International Law (W.E. Butler, ed. 1991). (1b/k, 3, 6).
Identifies failures of compliance with the laws of war as emanating from three causes: 1)
the lack of discipline or pathology of individual soldiers, 2) deliberate state policies intended to
gain strategic advantage over enemy states, and 3) lack of clarity as to the substantive content of
the legal rules. Regards the threat of reprisal as the most potent force for ensuring compliance
with the laws of war, with reputational concerns and normative commitments as far less
significant sources of restraint. Treats armed conflict as qualitatively different in terms of
regulability from other issue-areas of law.
Guzman, Andrew T., A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823
(2002). (1f, 2, 6, 7).
Surveys existing theories of compliance. Rejects the theoretical significance of substate
levels of analysis and presumes that states are self-interested unitary actors. Contends that states
comply with international law in order to develop and preserve the benefits of a reputation for
compliance and that the potential compliance is thus, to some degree, bounded by the importance
of reputation within particular issue-areas of international relations. Concedes that reputation is
less important in issue-areas of “high politics,” such as armed conflict, arms control, and
territory, than in issue-areas of “low politics,” such as economics and environmental protection.
States that future ILC research should concentrate within issue-areas in which reputation matters.
Haas, Peter M., Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative
Politics, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International
System (Dinah Shelton, ed. 2000). (2, 5, 7, 9).
Surveys ILC theories and describes the state of knowledge regarding international legal
compliance as underdeveloped and undertheorized. Enumerates epistemological and
methodological problems in evaluating compliance, including problems in conceptualizing
compliance, false reporting, unintentional noncompliance. Describes methodological tools
whereby the study of compliance can be systematized, including process tracing, aggregate
analysis of treaties, multivariate analysis, and counterfactual studies. Suggests that the primary
impediment to compliance is the unwillingness of states to pay the political costs to discipline
self-interested elements of domestic polities for whom compliance runs counter to their interests.
Haas, Peter M., Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in International
Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997). (1d, 5, 7, 9).
Describes methodological issues in measuring compliance and demands that ILC theories
be supported by empirical evidence. Surveys ILC theories to map the contours of the ILC field
and sketch a research agenda. Postulates an institutionalist theory that suggests that wealthy
liberal democratic states may be simultaneously more capable of complying and more
domestically responsive to the preferences of individuals and groups who desire compliance;
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thus, wealthy liberal democratic states are systematically more likely to comply than poorer,
illiberal states.
Handl, Günther, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations,
5 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 29 (1997). (6, 10).
Hypothesizes that state interests in ensuring compliance are directly proportional to the
complexity of an international legal regime and the costs of complying. Emphasizes that in
multilateral treaties state practice of parties can have the effect of modifying international legal
obligation, making it still more difficult to evaluate compliance. Advocates semi-formal peer
review procedures whereby parties to multilateral conventions can convene to specify
obligations, establish more transparent procedures for determining compliance, and “fine-tune”
enforcement measures.
Hathaway, Oona, Between Power and Principle: A Political Theory of International Law, 71 U.
Chi.
L. Rev. _ (2005). (1c/f, 2, 5, 7, 9).
Classifies ILC literature into rational actor and normative models and surveys their primary
hypotheses. Analyzes empirical evidence of state practice under human rights and environmental
treaties. Synthesizes key elements of rational choice and reputational theories and concludes that
state compliance decisions are shaped by the legal incentives engendered by domestic and
transnational enforcement of international law as well as by the nonlegal incentives created by
the reactions of external political actors in response to state compliance decisions. Offers
suggestions for future research in the ILC subfield.
Hathaway, Oona, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002).
(1c/f,
2, 6, 7, 9).
Surveys existing ILC theories. Notes the methodological unsophistication of
international legal scholarship and advocates introduction of empirical methods to harden the
discipline. Conducts quantitative investigation of compliance human rights treaties and
concludes that, although external normative pressures are successful in inducing state accessions,
state behavior is largely unaffected by legalization because a lack of effective monitoring and
enforcement erodes any incentives for self-interested states to modify conduct to meet treaty
obligations.
HENKIN, LOUIS, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (1967). (5, 7, 8).
Initiates the first major investigation of the phenomenon of compliance with international
law. Begins the development of a multivariate explanation for compliance that incorporates
variables from several levels of analysis, notably national values and cultural traditions regarding
attitudes toward law and authority and attributes of the political personalities of individual
decisionmakers who wield state power. Concludes that compliance with international law is the
rule rather than the exception and that the most fruitful method of enhancing compliance is likely
to be the fostering of domestic cultures of compliance.
Ho, Daniel E., Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle
Accord?, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 647 (2002). (1f, 2, 5, 9).
Highlights the lack of empirical research in the ILC subfield and notes that selection bias
erodes the significance of available studies. Challenges the liberalist premise that democracies
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are inherently more compliant with international law and counters that democratic regimes are
more corrupt and more fragmented domestically and consequently less likely to comply than
nondemocratic states. Argues instead that reputational concerns are central to the establishment
of compliance with “soft law” regimes and that a reputation for compliance confers benefits in
the form of a “stamp of approval” that other states recognize as an indicator of business
worthiness.
Huang, Peter H., International Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 237 (2002).
(1c/f, 2, 6, 8).
Complements rational choice theory by considering that actors are motivated by a desire
to preserve their reputations. Suggests that preferences in favor of legal compliance can be
induced by law in the sense that law modifies decisional strategies. Posits that compliance
behavior in the issue-area of international environmental law can be molded and create selfenforcing expectations that reduce the need for enforcement. Models a reputational theory of
international environmental law.
IWASAWA, YUJI, EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE IN INTERNATIIONAL LAW, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW (1998). (2, 3, 5).
Explains slow pace of Japanese domestic incorporation of human rights norms in terms of
a traditional and homogenous culture resistant to wholesale important of external concepts.
Suggests that engagement of human rights NGOs has been important to political transformation
but has not has similar influence on courts due to the dualist nature of the Japanese legal system.
Indirectly calls into question whether transnational legal processes are universally effective in
enhancing compliance.
Jacobson, Harold K., Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying
Compliance, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 569 (1998). (7, 9).
Surveys major ILC theories while noting and offering an account for the
underdevelopment of the field of ILC. Distinguishes high politics from low politics and suggests
that knowledge is likely to remain more limited in issue-areas where obligations are less clear,
such as in the case of customary international law, or in the case of newer sources of law. Calls
on legal and international relations scholars to jointly commit more resources to empirical study
and to the empirical description of compliance patterns as a necessary precondition to more bold
theorization.
Janis, Mark W., The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 Conn. J. Int'l L. 39 (2000). (5, 8, 9).
Conflates compliance and effectiveness. Outlines the methdological and epistemological
difficulties in evaluating compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, most crucially the lack of access to complete data and the
difficulty in evaluating partial compliance. Proposes that the increased efficacy of “Strasbourg”
law can be inferred from the growth in the membership of states parties to the European
Convention and from the fact that disputes are submitted for judicial review. Concedes that the
ultimate determinant of compliance may be the perception of legitimacy of a given legal regime,
and recognizes that legitimacy is a subjective assessment not susceptible to determination
through legal, as opposed to psychological, analysis.
Joyner, Christopher C., Compliance and Enforcement in New International Fisheries Law, 12
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 271 (1998). (5, 10).
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Distinguishes compliance from effectiveness and suggests that a high rate of compliance
may be an indication that the legal regime in question obligates little change in state behavior or
is so open to interpretation that any conduct can be described as compliant. Examines
multilateral treaties regulating commercial fishing and contends that for legal regimes to be
effective they must require conduct that is congruent with the self-interest of member-states.
Further argues that enforcement of international law is dependent not upon threats of sanctions
but upon the deployment of positive incentives sufficient to motivate states to comply and to
prosecute noncompliant nationals.
Joyner, Christopher C., Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening
Compliance with Soft International Law 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 401 (1998). (2, 9).
Counters the perception of “soft law” as insufficient to generate state compliance.
Surveys the history of state practice under the Antarctic Treaty and concludes that soft law
enables states to reach more precise agreements than might be possible in “hard law” format, that
state compliance with soft law agreements is better than expected, and that soft law agreements
form the customary law nucleus for future binding obligations.
Joyner, Christopher C., Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: Reflections on the United
Nations’ Experience Against Iraq, 32 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (1991). (2).
Links the effectiveness of the enforcement model to the transparency of the underlying
norms for the violation of which sanctions are imposed, the speed with which enforcement is
undertaken, the comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, and the willingness of powerful
states to make material contributions to the success of enforcement. Considers the UN system to
be an important site for maximizing the perception of legitimacy of resulting enforcement
measures.
KECK, MARGARET F., & SIKKINK, KATHRYN, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS (1998).
(1i, 5, 8).
Criticizes liberalism as undertheorized in regard to the process whereby individuals and
groups acquire their preferences regarding international legal compliance. Rejects the centrality
of the state to explanations of contemporary international relations. Theorizes that transnational
epistemic communities consisting of uniquely situated individuals and groups highly committed
to normative programs organize within issue-areas and diffuse their influence across national
boundaries through a combination of persuasion, socialization, and electoral pressure. Attributes
state compliance preferences and behavior to the influence of these epistemic communities and
ascribes the evolution of norms, and compliance with these norms, to the effects of the process
whereby states and their preferences are socially constructed.
Kelly, Claire R., Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 36 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. _ (2004).
(1e/g, 2 6).
Builds upon transnational legal process and managerial theories and attributes compliance
to the phenomenon described as “enmeshment,” which occurs when a state finds that its interests
and the substantive rules of an international legal regime are closely related. Differentiates
between issue-areas and suggests that the greatest likelihood that a state will become enmeshed
in a particular international legal regime exists in issue-areas of low politics. Concludes that
harnessing the capacity of enmeshment to enhance regime effectiveness requires a high degree of
formalization—i.e, the treaty language must be as precise as parties will tolerate.
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Kelly, Claire R., The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative
Feedback Loop, 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 673 (2001). (1d/i, 2, 5, 7).
Theorizes that self-enforcing regimes—treaties that create organs with powers to impose
direct sanctions on non-compliers—may, by bypassing domestic sites of normative interpretation
and national identity and interest assertion, create negative consequences for compliance.
Suggests that enhancing compliance may require that this “normative feedback loop” be
reintegrated into the functioning of self-enforcing regimes by creating exemptions from the
operation of legal rules or allowing non-state actors that would normally participate in the
domestic interpretive process greater opportunities to introduce national constituency preferences
into international value and identity formation. Proposes a modified constructivist theory that
explains compliance with self-enforcing regimes as a function of the degree to which the
normative feedback loop is reintegrated and national constituencies are allowed to construct
shared expectations and understandings of the rules that constitute international law.
Kelly, Claire R., Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 545 (2004). (1c, 2, 7).
Modifies the realist premise that legal rules are epiphenomenal to state practice by
positing that as states become “enmeshed” in legal regimes they come to rely upon the benefits
of regime membership, which cumulatively outweigh the costs of compliance even in individual
“hard cases.” Suggests that legal regimes themselves develop causal significance in explaining
and predicting compliance even within the realist account of international relations and
international law. Supports this modified realist argument with empirical examples from a series
of regimes, including the EU, WTO, Law of the Sea Convention, IMF, and International
Criminal Court.
Keohane, Robert O., Compliance With International Commitments: Politics Within a Framework
of Law, 86 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 176 (1992). (2, 7, 9).
Suggests that empirical studies of compliance might treat compliance decisions as the
dependent variable and the relative power of state, the nature of international institutions, the
clarity of legal obligations, the strength of underlying norms, and linkages to domestic
considerations as independent variables. Surveys ILC theories. Notes that building and testing
theories requires the synthesis of the methods of international law and international relations—
the determination of whether compliance has occurred requires legal judgment, while the
analysis of causal relationships between rules and behaviors requires the resort to social scientific
methods.
Keohane, Robert O. International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harv. J. Int’l
L. 487 (1997). (5, 7, 9).
Bifurcates ILC into “instrumentalist” and “normative optics, with the former consisting
of a cluster of realist, rational choice, and enforcement theories skeptical about the significance
of norms in fostering rule-governed cooperation, and the latter a cluster of liberal, legal process,
managerial, reputational, and constructivist theories that regard norms as having a causal effect
upon state behaviors and as capable of exerting a “pull” toward compliance. Critiques both
optics. Regards policy elites as crucial players in establishing and maintaining compliance.
Elaborates an agenda for future interdisciplinary research.
Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 345 (1998). (7, 9, 10).
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Challenges the notion of compliance as the mere correspondence of behavior with legal
rules and argues for the concept of “effectiveness” as the benchmark of legal regimes. Surveys
existing theories of ILC, including realism, liberalism, constructivism, managerialism, and
transnational legal process. Cautions against empirical research that fails to account for causes
and effects of legal rules, and warns against purely positivist theories that ignore considerations
of justice and morality.
Knop, Karen, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. &
Pol. 501 (2000). (1g, 2, 5, 10).
Calls for a more nuanced understanding of the role of domestic courts as agents in the
enforcement of international law. Suggests that domestic courts, because they regard
international law as persuasive, and not binding, authority, ultimately transform and heterogenize
international law. Implies that the enforcement model of international legal compliance that
relies on domestic courts, or “transjudicialism,” must either make room for variations in the
degree and direction of compliance across states or else give way to international judicial fora.
Knox, John H., A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 Ecology L.Q. 1 (2001).
(2, 7).
Contends that the role of international adjudication in promoting compliance with
international environmental law is limited, in significant part because states are unwilling to
jeopardize relations with other states by bringing claims against them. Examines the function of
various international regimes that permit non-governmental organizations and/or individuals to
trigger judicial review. Concludes that permitting non-state actors and other private parties to
bring claims before international judicial tribunals or less formal dispute resolution mechanisms
will enhance the effectiveness of the managerial model of compliance by creating a more
factually complete and less confrontational environment.
Koh, Harold, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 (1996). (1g, 5, 10).
Surveys ILC theories. Maintains that the key actors in compliance are not just states, as
realism postulates, but also nongovernmental organizations, institutions, and individuals.
Hypothesizes that repetitive interactions within transnational epistemic communities consisting
largely of foreign policy elites give rise to norms favoring cooperation and that the
internalization of these norms in domestic law and legal institutions fosters the progressive
evolution of rule-governed cooperation. Suggests that states can be induced not merely toward
compliance but into obedience, defined as voluntary compliance in the absence of sanctions.
Koh, Harold, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997). (1g, 2, 5, 7).
Divides ILC field into two camps, the first comprised of managerialist and transnational
legal process theories and dedicated to the defense of the premises that international law is really
law and that states generally comply, and the second populated by realists and rational choice
theorists skeptical of the causal significance of international law. Surveys the origins and
development of international law and elaborates the Chayes’ managerial theory and Franck’s
legitimacy theory. Presents and heuristically tests transnational legal process theory, which
postulates that repetitive interactions within transnational epistemic communities consisting
largely of foreign policy elites give rise to norms favoring cooperation and that the
internalization of these norms in domestic law and legal institutions fosters the progressive

19

evolution of rule-governed cooperation. Concludes that states can be socialized toward
obedience, and not merely to enhanced compliance.
Koskenniemi, Martii, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1947 (1990). (1g, 5).
Contends that non-legal sources of behavioral prescription and proscription exert greater
influence upon states than do legal sources. Stresses the importance of norm inculcation within
domestic legal regimes to the promotion of compliance.
KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH V., RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989). (2, 3, 5, 7, 9).
Describes international law circa 1989 as a primitive legal system and attributes primary
importance to domestic legal systems in regard to the enforcement of international legal norms.
Conceptualizes noncompliance with international legal norms as not an act of lawlessness but
rather as a gambit to transform, or bargain for the transformation of, norms and rules. Cautions
that attempts to enforce compliance through coercive measures are bound to fail and urges
scholars to fashion alternative methods.
Ku, Julian G., The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with
International Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 457 (2004). (5).
Critiques the “nationalist” conception of international relations, which assumes the
exclusion of States, and advances a revisionist model in which States, as general sovereigns, play
an important role in the interpretation of customary international law, in the implementation of
non-self-executing treaties, and in the administration of private international law more generally.
Situates the primary locus of compliance with international law in the constituent States of the
United States, and in particular in State courts and legislatures. Suggest that domestic legislation
may be more effective in promoting compliance. Concludes that affording a broader to the
States in the implementation of international law may better comport with traditional notions of
federalism while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of international law.
Leary, Virginia A., Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor, in International Compliance with
Nonbinding Accord (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997). (9, 10).
Argues that “compliance” is too narrow an approach to the study of the relationship of
nonbinding norms to state behavior and that the concept of “influence” is more appropriate to the
analysis of “soft law.” Admits the difficulty in measuring the influence of soft law due to the
limited dissemination of its normative pronouncements, particularly in the field of international
labor law. Suggests that the translation of soft law into customary international law may
promote their effectiveness, but notes that this hypothesis is not yet supported by empirical
research.
Levit, Janet Koven, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or
Promise?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 281 (1999). (1g, 2, 5).
Surveys ILC theories. Adopts the transnational legal process premise that the
internalization of international rules and norms within the domestic legal systems of states is the
most propitious avenue toward compliance. Examines the constitutionalization strategy
employed by the Argentine legal system and attributes compliance failures to knowledge deficits
rather than deliberate inaction. Concludes, consistent with constructivist theory, that epistemic
communities of human rights activists are essential to the support of internalization strategies and
ultimately to compliance.
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Levit, Janet Koven, the Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement
on Officially Supported Export Credits, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 65 (2004). (2, 7, 9).
Examines empirical data concerning the the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially
Supported Export Credits—a soft-law framework for cooperation in the international trade and
finance issue-area—and explains a systematic pattern of compliance as a function of the
flexibility, pragmatism, and consensus-based participatory decision-making procedures of the
Arrangement. Suggests that narrow rational choice accounts of state compliance are belied by
evidence suggesting that states continue to cooperate even in the absence of short-term benefits
not merely because they desire the longer-term benefits of cooperation but because participation
in the regime restructures their preferences and their identities, through a dynamic and interactive
process, to create inherent interests in compliance and in membership in a social community
committed to incrementally strengthening regime norms. Concludes that explanations of the
Arrangement and of the importance of legal rules to the establishment and effectiveness of other
soft-law agreements require integration of reputational and managerial theories.
Louka, Elli. Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not Only
About the Protection of the Environment, 10 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 79 (1996). (1e, 5).
Attributes failure of enforcement mechanisms to create compliance with international
environmental law to the inadequacy of resources. Suggests that the key to promoting
compliance lies in the nurturing of transnational norm-generating communities that inculcate
norms more deeply into state decisionmaking and the institution of domestic incentives that
reward cooperative behavior. Concludes that the deepest cooperation requires iterative, state-tostate negotiation and the reconstruction and convergence of national identities.
March, James G., & Olsen, Johan P., The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders, 52 Int’l Org. 943 (1998). (1d/i/k, 7, 8, 9).
Articulates a theory of “new institutionalism” that hypothesizes that the development of
transnational networks of domestic bureaucracies, courts, and administrative agencies, along
with the officials who staff them, are becoming the primary agents for the promulgation of new
normative and legal regulations. Rejects the “logic of consequences,” which regards compliance
behaviors as the result of the rational calculation and pursuit of interests, whether by individuals,
organizations, or states, in favor of a “logic of appropriateness,” which suggests that compliance
behavior, along with the identities, rules, and institutions that are theoretically significant in the
explanation of international relations more generally, is shaped by social and moral norms that
causally influence individual preferences. Describes points of intersection between the two
logics and concludes that the complexity of international relations is such that theoretical islands,
rather than a meta-theory, should be the focus of ILC scholars.
Mearsheimer, John J., The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 Int’l Sec. Rev. 5
(1995). (1a, 3).
Rejects the causal significance of law in relation to state behaviors. Contends that states
make decisions regarding compliance with international law solely in terms of whether
compliance will tilt the balance of power in their favor. Argues that empirical evidence lends
little or no support to the proposition that cooperation can be built and sustained upon a
normative foundation.
Mitchell, Ronald, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in Improving Compliance with
International Law (James Cameron Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick, eds. 1996). (7, 9, 10).

21

Surveys ILC theories. Links sources of compliance failures to issues of faulty regime
design. Resists the tendency to equate state behavior consistent with legal rules with compliance
and argues that claims regarding the effectiveness of legal regimes must be subjected to
empirical analysis.
Moore, David H., A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 879
(2003). (1c/f, 2).
Challenges the legalist assertion that compliance is the rule rather than the exception.
Surveys and briefly critiques existing theories. Supplements rational choice theories by
propounding a signaling theory” that explains compliance with human rights treaties even in the
absence of pressure as a strategy intended to maintain and enhance status within a highly
interrelated community of states.
Moore, John Norton, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39
Va. J. Int’l L. 881 (1999). (3, 6).
Cautions that too much scholarly attention is focused on the continuing refinement and
promulgation of international legal regimes and too little upon compliance, the “greatest
challenge for the future of international law[.]” Queries whether high politics issue-areas may be
less regulable through law than issue-areas of low politics. Contends that informal political
measures, such as reprisal or reciprocal conduct, may be more effective in promoting long-term
compliance than formal institutional mechanisms.
Morrow, James D., The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International
Politics, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 41 (2002). (1b, 2, 3, 6).
Undertakes empirical analysis of compliance with the laws of war and concludes that
compliance can be secured only through voluntarism or through effective enforcement measures.
Treats states as the relevant level of analysis. Operationalizes the laws of war as a series of
prescription and proscriptions with regard to particular “battle strategies” and offers a rational
choice explanation of compliance and noncompliance as self-interested calculations of the
benefits and costs of electing particular battle strategies. Predicts noncompliance when the
benefits are greater than the associated costs imposed in reprisal. Suggests that the capacity of
law to regulate state behavior in the issue-area of armed conflict may be more limited than in
other issue-areas.
Nakagawa, Junji, Securing Compliance in Traditional and Contemporary International Law: A
Theoretical Analysis, in Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal Issues: From Theory into
Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Junjia Nakagawa, & Linda C. Reif, eds. 1998). (2, 4, 9).
Examines trends in ILC and notes a theoretically significant shift toward nontraditional
methods of enhancing compliance, including soft law and third-party dispute resolution
mechanisms. Notes further that the proliferation of non-state actors and non-European states as
subjects and authors of international law may imposes duties to comply upon actors that lack the
capacity to comply with legal regimes. Suggests that non-binding regimes that subject disputes
over compliance to neutral institutions and seek to induce compliance through positive
incentives, rather than through coercion, may be the path to enhancing the efficiency of
international law.
O’Brien, William V., Teaching Humanitarian Law in Universities and Law Schools, 31 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1011 (1982). (3, 6).
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Recognizes the fragility of the legal regime governing the laws of war in relation to state
sovereignty and the imperatives of security. Challenges the orthodox view that reprisal is the
sole method for ensuring compliance with the laws of war. Concludes that the norms underlying
the laws of war are so fundamental to the maintenance of international order and justice that
states must be willing to refrain from reprisal and submit violations to judicial determination if
these normative principles are to be protected and promoted.
O’Connell , Mary Ellen, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law, 3
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 47 (1995). (1g, 5).
Argues that compliance with international environmental law is the rule rather than the
exception and that most compliance is voluntary in nature. Rejects enforcement, whether
through formal international legal institutions or informal reprisals, as a means of enhancing
compliance due to a host of limiting factors, including an absence of jurisdiction or the inability
to impose effective sanctions for violations. Posits that domestic courts may prove the most
effective means of securing compliance with international environmental law if doctrinal and
political obstacles to adjudication of claims, such as standing, forum non conveniens, and
sovereign immunity, can be reduced.
Okuwaki, Naoya, The Changing Nature of International Obligations: Can Voluntary Compliance
Overcome the Difficulties in the Present Nation-State System?, in Trilateral Perspectives on
International Legal Issues: From Theory into Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Junjia
Nakagawa, & Linda C. Reif, eds. 1998). (2, 4, 9, 10).
Stresses that proper empirical measurement of the effectiveness of a legal regime requires
distinguishing lex ferenda from crystallized international legal obligations. Distinguishes
effectiveness, measured as changes in state behaviors caused by the rules of legal regimes, from
compliance, measured as the mere correspondence of behaviors and rules. Suggests that the
most difficult obstacle facing legal architects is the re-negotiation of the normative content of
existing legal regimes, and of customary international law, to take into consideration the
divergent normative preferences of non-Western states that did not participate equally in the
formation of these regimes.
Posner, Eric, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (2003). (1c, 2, 3).
Develops a rational choice theory of compliance that explains the laws of war as a prewar agreement to abstain from enumerated “battle strategies” and predicts that states will comply
with rules that limit the resort to particular methods or means only if the benefits gained through
the resort to these methods or means are less than the sanction costs imposed by other states in
reprisal. Expresses skepticism that states will generally comply with the laws of war. Calls for
more empiricism and greater parsimony in ILC.
Posner, Richard A., Some Economics of International Law: Comment on Conference Papers, 31
J. Leg. Stud. 321 (2002). (1c, 3, 7).
Surveys some initial applications of rational choice theory to ILC. Assumes that state
behavior is essentially identical to that of individuals, who are further presumed to be rational
actors in that they are self-interested and make conscious welfare-maximizing choices. Rejects
the theoretical relevance of substate levels of analysis. Challenges the premise of reputational
theory that reputation is unitary and that states have a single reputation across issue-areas.
Discounts the significance of norms as a basis for building and maintaining compliance with
international law.
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Purvis, Nigel, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 81 (1991).
(3, 4).
Presents a critical legal studies theory of international law that rejects the primacy of
states in the international system, disputes the liberal notion that an objective moral consensus
regarding justice is possible, and challenges the determinacy of international legal obligations.
Suggests that compliance may not in fact be possible given the utter indeterminacy and
incoherence of international law.
Ratner, Steven R., Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J.
Int’l L. & Pol. 591 (2000). (1g/k, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Queries whether international law can expect to secure compliance in cases of ethnic
conflict and human rights issues and concludes in the affirmative. Surveys and organizes ILC
field into normative and positive theoretical clusters. Analyzes the functions of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities for the Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and suggests that because they fail to operationalize “soft law” norms existing theories
are unable to explain significant forces that induce compliance with emerging, if uncodified,
sources of behavioral regulation. Articulates a “mediation theory” which postulates that
individuals are relevant actors in international relations and that certain high-status normative
“intermediaries” can play theoretically significant roles in promoting compliance.
Ratner, Steven R., Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human Dignity in Times of Crisis: On
the Possibilities for Meaningful Self-Restraint, 5 Theoretical Inq. L. 81 (2004). (1i, 6).
Differentiates the prospects for nurturing compliance in regard to issue-areas of high
politics and low politics. Describes the dilemma for states facing grave crises in which the only
alternatives appear to be noncompliance with legal regimes, particularly human rights or
humanitarian law, or willing acceptance of national catastrophe. Suggests that compliance may
be possible even during crises and national emergencies provided states can be induced, before
the crises or emergencies arise and fundamentally transform attitudes regarding compliance, to
“tie their own hands” through precommitments to restraint.
Ratner, Steven R., Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 2055 (2003). (1f/g, 5).
Extends domestic constitutional law “precommitment theory” into the realm of
international human rights and humanitarian law. Notes that some states enter into international
treaties either without the intent to comply or solely to secure reciprocity or the benefits of
association, and not on the basis of agreement with underlying norms. Builds upon reputational
and signaling theories and suggests that the seemingly related questions of why states “bind their
hands” in advance of future temptations to engage in specific conduct by entering into
international legal obligations and why states comply may be entirely separate lines of inquiry.
Raustiala, Kal, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (2002). (1i, 2, 6, 7).
Surveys ILC theories to assess the influence of informal transnational linkages between
state officials upon compliance. Draws empirical support from state practice for the proposition
that realism, managerialism, and transnational legal process theory each imply a positive role for
these transgovernmental networks in enhancing compliance with treaties and with less formal
transnational agreements. Concludes that, particularly in issue-areas of great complexity and in
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regard to low politics, transgovernmental networks will increasingly come to substitute for
treaties as the modality whereby to coordinate cooperation and that scholars must retool existing
ILC theories to adapt to this transformation.
Raustiala, Kal, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case
W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 (2000). (2, 7, 9, 10)
Reorients focus from compliance to effectiveness as the better gauge of the function of
legal regimes to modify state behavior toward norm-governed cooperation. Surveys existing ILC
theories in three baskets: rationalism, normativism, and liberalism. Evaluates studies to
heuristically test the effectiveness of international environmental treaties. Concludes that an
empirical and multidisciplinary approach that draws upon the insights of international relations
theories is required if international legal regimes are ultimately to be rendered more effective.
Saunders, Phillip M., Development Cooperation and Compliance with International
Environmental Law: Past Experience and Future Prospects, in Trilateral Perspectives on
International Legal Issues: From Theory into Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Junjia
Nakagawa, & Linda C. Reif, eds. 1998). (1e, 3).
Identifies the proliferation of soft law agreements, in which states seek to express
normative commitments without accepting legal limitations on their sovereignty, as a principle
impediment to compliance. Notes that the complexity of many recent international legal
regimes, coupled with the implementation costs such regimes impose upon members, further
weaken the prospects for compliance. Expresses skepticism about the prospects for compliance
but stresses that financial and technical assistance to underdeveloped states is an imperative if
compliance, particularly with international environmental law, is to advance.
Setear, John K., An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations
Theory and International Law, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 139 (1996). (1c/e, 2).
Examines several arms control agreements to support a theory that draws from
managerialism and rational choice theory and posits that treaty parties are in an iterative
relationship in which they learn over time deepen the natural and rational propensity to
cooperate. Suggests that by developing rules and procedures to make the rational preference for
cooperation more effective, states produce long-term public gains. Concludes that obligations
will gradually increase over time as the depth of cooperation evolves and that compliance is a
rational outcome.
Scott, Shirley V., The Impact on International Law of U.S. Noncompliance, in United States
Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte, eds. 2003).
(2, 9).
Suggests that the indeterminacy of international law is such that the concept of
compliance is inadequate to the development and testing of theories, and notes that many
states—not just the U.S.—have mixed records of compliance. Concludes that the absence of a
clear distinction between legal and illegal behavior in many issue-areas of law introduces
methodological difficulties into the field of ILC. Suggests that mitigation of methodological
difficulties may require the selection of cases about which a consensus can be reached regarding
the facts of compliance or noncompliance.
Shelton, Dinah, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft Law, in International
Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997). (9,10).
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Distinguishes the study of compliance of “soft law,” or nonbinding declarations of norms,
from treaty-based international legal obligations. Disputes the managerialist assertion that
compliance cannot be measured empirically. Recognizes the heightened difficulty in
operationalizing soft law compliance and in acquiring, evaluating, and scoring compliance data.
Concedes that establishing causality between soft law rules and behaviors is particularly difficult
and potentially beyond the methodological capacity of the discipline.
Shen, Jianming, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 Dick. J. Int’l L. 287
(1999). (1h, 7).
Develops an ILC taxonomy that divides the field in naturalist and positivist theories and
their variants. Enumerates several theoretically significant variables to the explanation and
prediction of state compliance, including national-cultural attitudes toward law and legal
authority, the salience of reputation in the personal calculus of head decisionmakers, and the
likelihood of sanctions or reprisals in the event of noncompliance. Concludes that compliance is
the inherent preference of states because the very existence of law creates a normative force that
impels them toward compliance.
Shihata, Ibrahim F. I., Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International
Environmental Agreements—Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank’s Experience, 9
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 37 (1996). (2).
Embraces the managerialist hypothesis that attributes compliance failures to a lack of
technical capacity. Generalizes from the World Bank experience to suggest that enforcement
measures are ill-suited to enhancing compliance with international environmental law.
Recommends packages of technical support and transnational dispute resolution mechanisms to
enable states to harmonize interests and expectations and thereby enhance compliance.
Simmons, Beth A. Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and
Territorial Disputes, 46 Confl. Resolution 829 (2002). (1c/f, 2, 6, 9).
Contends that rational, self-interested states enter into international legal agreements to
achieve outcomes and reap gains not available through independent action or informal
negotiation alone. Argues further that the mere existence of legally binding rules are causally
significant in transforming state preferences and decisions, even in regard to issue-areas of high
politics such as territory, because rules impose costs upon decisions not to comply. Predicts that
as operant norms diffuse and solidify, reputational costs associated with noncompliance rise
along with the prospects for compliance.
Simmons, Beth A., International Law and International Relations: Scholarship at the Intersection
of Principles and Politics, 95 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 271 (2001). (2, 3, 6, 9).
Laments the shallowness of interdisciplinary collaboration between international law and
international relations in the investigation of the phenomenon of compliance. Describes the
skepticism of international legal scholars at the proposition that legal rules can be operationalized
as variables and integrated into theoretical models that in turn can be tested with the assistance of
social science methodologies. Suggests that if interdisciplinary collaborations continue to find
that law exerts no or little independent causal influence upon state compliance behaviors the
likelihood of future collaboration within the ILC field will diminish.
Simmons, Beth A, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of
Money?, 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 323 (2000). (1c/f, 2, 7, 9).
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Conceptualizes international financial law as a signaling device used by states-parties to
relevant treaties designed to demonstrate “good citizenship” to markets and other states and in
turn to reap the associated benefits of trade and investment. Surveys and faults much of the
literature in ILC for methodological and epistemological shortcomings, including lack of
sufficient rigor and an absence of empiricism. Explains and predicts compliance as the strategy
to preserve these reputational benefits, and concludes that those states most sensitive to
reputational effects will be most likely to comply.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503
(1995). (1d, 5, 7).
Posits that the key actors in regard to compliance are not states but rather individuals,
institutions, organizations, and other components of civil society. Contends that it is the nature
of the domestic politics that predominate within state borders that determines the composition of
representative governments and in turn the willingness of states to subordinate sovereignty to
normative, and thus legal, regulation. Theorizes that liberal democracies are inherently more
committed to the “rule of law,” more prone to absorb international legal obligations into their
domestic legal orders and to diffuse these obligations through foreign policy bureaucracies, and
more willing to permit interest groups to mobilize mass electoral support for international legal
norms than non-democratic states. Explains and predicts compliance as a function of the degree
to which the aggregation of the preferences of key domestic individuals and groups directs the
representative state toward norm-following and legal regulation.
SLAUGHTER, ANNE-MARIE, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). (5, 7).
Describes transnational government networks—informal linkages between counterpart
state officials that transcend national boundaries—as important resources for enhancing capacity
for compliance and building upon the natural propensity of states toward voluntary compliance.
Suggests further that by disseminating administrative resources and information, government
networks reinforce cooperative norms and strengthen the international rule of law.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, & Raustiala, Kal, in Handbook of International Relations (W. Carlsnaes,
T. Risse, & B.A. Simmons, eds. 2002). (7, 9, 10).
Conceptualizes the field of ILC and surveys existing theories. Traces the intellectual
history of ILC. Sketches a research agenda.
Smith, Edwin M., Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1549 (1991). (1c, 2).
Builds upon dynamic theories of cooperation and iterated game theory to develop a
rational choice account that explains arms control agreements as the result of self-interested
states learning to cooperate and jointly share the relative gains available through compliance with
gradually evolving legal regimes. Suggests that treaties are but a part of a broader pattern of
nonlegal relationships between parties and that formal institutions are unnecessary to support
compliance, as parties value and desire to maintain and improve this relational pattern and
converged expectations and the informal mechanism of reciprocity are adequate to the task.
Indicates that the extrapolation of the findings of the study to complex issue-areas such as trade,
environmental management, and technology are possible.
Stone, Christopher D., Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98
Am. J. Int’l L.276 (2004). (1c/e, 2, 6).
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Criticizes procedural rational choice approaches. Expands the concept of “common but
differentiated responsibilities,” which postulates that states are impressed with equal obligations
but vary in their capacities for compliance, and suggests that enforcement costs will be reduced if
more capable states make allowances for the less capable. Elaborates a model for negotiating
differential responsibilities that amalgamates managerial and rational choice theories. Applies
the model to the Kyoto Protocol.
Strauss, Andrew L., Overcoming the Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise
of a People’s Assembly, 9 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 489 (1999). (1i/k, 4, 8).
Attributes responsibility for state compliance and non-compliance with international law
to the elites at the apex of state power. Contends that in practice the principle of the formal
equality of states gives way to a hierarchy in which powerful states are able to prevent the
effectiveness of international treaties by mobilizing opposition, as in the case of the U.S. and the
Kyoto Protocol. Advocates an international legislative body, termed Global Peoples Assembly,
with the power to create and enforce laws directly against states and individuals. Calls for
“compliance from the inside out” whereby states, stripped of their status as the sole authors and
primary enforcers of international law, would lose the power to determine whether their nationals
complied in favor of this representative assembly, through which the will of their nationals
would be given direct effect.
Sullivan, Scott M., Changing the Premise of International Legal Remedies: The Unfounded
Adoption of Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition, 7 UCLA J. Int’l & Foreign Aff. 265
(2002/2003). (5, 7)
Examines the introduction by the International Court of Justice of the mechanism of
Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition [AGNR] as a novel remedy for breach of
customary international legal obligations. Surveys legitimacy theory and transnational legal
process theory and concludes that the use of AGNRs is neither sufficiently legitimated nor
adequately internalized as an operative norm within the international community to support the
broader process of legalization.
Swaine, Edward T., Rational Custom, 52 Duke L. J. 559 (2002). (1c/f, 2, 3, 9).
Contends, on the basis of empirical evidence, that the dispute between legitimacy theory
and rational choice theory over the causal significance of norms to state behaviors can be
reconciled through adoption of a thick theory of rationality. Argues that under some
circumstances even rational self-interested states may determine that complying with customary
law may maximize their welfare because they regard affording respect to international legal
processes or to particular normative principles as inherently valuable or, even more probably,
because reputation matters. Suggests that maximization of international cooperation must take
into account the possibility that even self-interested states may actively seek to adhere to
customary legal obligations.
Tallberg, Jonas, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56
Int’l Org. 609 (2002). (1b/e, 2, 5, 7, 10).
Assesses the competing claims of enforcement theory, which hypothesizes that the threat
of sanctions induces compliance, and managerial theory, which contends that the inherent
propensity of states to comply can be maximized through positive inducements, the provision of
technical assistance, and the establishment of fora to aid negotiation and harmonization of
policies and interests. Examines the practice of the European Union, a regime that incorporates
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elements of both enforcement and management in a “management enforcement ladder,” and
concludes that the inclusion of both mechanisms creates the most effective regime. Compares
the EU to other international legal regimes, including the World Trade Organization, the
European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights to conclude that the EU
experience, though historically distinct, is replicable and that regimes in issue-areas such as
trade, environmental protection, and human rights will achieve greatest effectiveness through a
holistic approach to compliance.
Tay, Simon S.C., Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge for International Environmental Law and
Sustainable Development, 11 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 241 (1999). (1e, 2).
Advances the managerialist premise that the primary obstacle to compliance with
environmental law is technical incapacity. Notes that failures in compliance with environmental
regimes have serious transborder consequences. Enumerates myriad sources of and explanations
for inadequate compliance support offered by existing international and regional organizational
mechanisms. Suggests that enhanced compliance with international environmental law will
likely requre developed states and even private actors to offer positive inducements—“carrots”—
to states with low technical capacities.
Thompson, Alexander, Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and
Pitfalls, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 285 (2002). (2, 8, 9).
Accepts the rational choice assumption that legal decisions are market-like choices, but
faults rational choice theory for failing to offer a clear and testable definition of rationality.
Concludes that the influences of reputation are less salient with regard to states than in regard to
individuals. Challenges scholars in the ILC field to properly model their theories by specifying
testable and falsifiable hypotheses.
Trachtman, Joel P., Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. (1999). (2, 3).
Explains the proliferation of “soft law” agreements and the indeterminacy of international
legal regimes as essential to attract and preserve powerful states as members by allowing them to
avoid circumstances in which they perceive no alternative other than patent noncompliance.
Rejects the transnational legal process prediction that obedience is the ultimate objective of
international law and suggests instead that the possibilities for compliance will always be
tempered by the realities of state self-interests.
Trimble, Philip, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 Stan. L. Rev.
811 (1990). (4, 5).
Advocates the centrality of international law to the construction of the post-Cold War
international order. Surveys the critical legal studies critique of realism. Develops the liberalist
premise that the first step in the diffusion of and compliance with international legal obligations
is the incorporation of international law in the domestic legal systems of states. Advances the
core premise common to legitimacy theory and constructivism which holds that the perception
by domestic elites in the judicial and executive branches of government that international legal
obligations are legitimate is necessary to induce voluntary compliance.
Tyler, Tom R., Compliance with International Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29
N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 219 (1997). (1h/k, 2, 5, 8, 10).
Surveys empirical studies that support the assertion that legal rules fail to marshal
sufficient deterrent threats to enforce compliance. Contends that effective legal regimes require
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voluntary compliance, which in turn requires the promotion of a “culture of compliance” rooted
in normative perceptions of law, and the institutions that administer law, as moral and legitimate.
Identifies lack of trust in institutions and officials as a principal obstacle to the enhancement of
legal legitimacy and proposes “moral development strategies” to re-establish trust.
Weiss, Edith Brown, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements:
The Baker’s Dozen Myths, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1555 (1999). (2, 5, 10).
Describes the concept of compliance in scalar, rather than dichotomous, terms, and
contends that whether states adhere to their international agreements is a matter of degree.
Distinguishes effectiveness from compliance and urges scholars to focus on the former. Argues
that the most effective agreements may be those that are tolerant of some defection. Disputes the
liberalist premise that democracies and free market polities are inherently more compliant than
undemocratic states, and challenges the conclusion of enforcement theory that coercion is
necessary to support cooperation. Concludes that regime architects must be prepared to consider
a range of strategies for inducing compliance and tailor each agreement to its membership.
Wendt, Alexander, Constructing International Politics, 20 Int’l Sec. 71 (1995). (1i, 8).
Hypothesizes that the fundamental structures of international relations are social rather
than material and that these structures shape the identities and preferences of actors. Contends
that the subjective preferences of individuals, groups, and states can be constructed by
transnational, interactive, and transformative social processes cumulatively known as
globalization to favor cooperation and compliance with the normative content of legal regimes.
Enunciates an important role for human agency in the social processes of construction of
preferences favoring compliance with law.
Williamson, Richard L., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control Some
Compliance Hypotheses, 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 59 (2003). (1b, 2, 6, 7).
Distinguishes ‘effectiveness” from “compliance” in the context of arms control treaties.
Identifies a number of factors that enhance compliance, including inclusion of all relevant states
in treaty membership and maximization of the clarity of legal obligations. Highlights
methdological difficulties in assessing compliance, including sui generis nature of cases, absence
of available data, and differential capacities of states. Briefly surveys ILC theories and propounds
a series of testable hypotheses generally favoring “hard law” over “soft law” as more likely to
foster compliance.
Yoshida, O., Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol’s Noncompliance Procedure
and the Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 95
(1999). (1e, 2, 6, 10).
Differentiates “hard” enforcement—international adjudication and sanctions—from
“soft” enforcement—reporting, monitoring, and verification backed by financial incentives to
compliance—in international environmental law. Examines the application of soft enforcement
mechanisms in the context of the ozone regimes. Suggests that the selection of a flexible
definition of “noncompliance,” coupled with soft enforcement mechanisms employed by treatycreated institutions governed democratically and multilaterally by states-parties and free to
employ not only principles of law but of equity in evaluating compliance, may well be the ideal
approach to fostering cooperation more generally in the issue-area of environmental protection.
YOUNG, ORAN R., COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1979). (1k, 3, 5, 8).
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Discounts the causal significance of legal regulation in regard to the behavior of actors in
social relations generally. Treats individuals, the ultimate subjects of all law and the actors
responsible for compliance decisions, as the relevant focus of ILC theories. Hypothesizes that a
host of individual psychological variables that tap a series of beliefs, motives, and images, such
as the desire to generate reciprocity, altruism, reputational concerns, fear of sanctions, social
pressures, or moral obligations, better explain and predict the phenomenon of compliance
decisionmaking than variables drawn from other levels of analysis.
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